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Recent Decisions
CONFLICT OF LAWS - STATE'S RIGHT To ENFORCE TAX ASSESSED
AGAINST NoN-RESIDENT
Under an income tax statute of the State of Minnesota, the
Commissioner of Taxation of that state prepared and filed a
delinquent return for a non-resident alleged to have received
income from business transacted within that state in the year
1940. An action was then brought in the courts of the State of
Ohio, the defendant residing therein, for the amount of the tax
plus interest. It was not shown that the defendant had been pres-
ent in Minnesota during the year 1940 or at any time thereafter.
The tax was assessed by an administrative official of the State
of Minnesota without personal service, and the statute made it
prima facie valid and correct. It appeared that the defendant
owned no property in that state. Held, That part of the statute
relating to non-residents was an illegal attempt by the State of
Minnesota to extend its sovereignty beyond its boundaries and
control and bind the defendant, and, as such, was violative of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Minnesota
v. Karp, 84 Ohio App. 51 (1949).
The question of the validity of state statutes fixing personal
liability on non-resident individuals and corporations has been
the subject of much litigation. It is well settled that a state
may exercise jurisdiction by substituted service over non-resident
corporations. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining
and Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917); St. Marys Petroleum Co. v.
West Virginia, 203 U. S. 183 (1906). In a leading case, it was
held that the activities of the non-resident corporation within
the state established between the state and the corporation suffi-
cient contacts or ties to make it reasonable and just, and in con-
formity to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
for the state to enforce an obligation against the corporation aris-
ing out of its activities therein, and that service of process upon
one of the corporation's agents within the state, and notice sent
by registered mail to the corporation at its home office satisfies
the requirements of due process. International Shoe Co. v. State
of Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
The field of such legislation pertaining to individuals would
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seem to be somewhat more unsettled. The majority of the early
cases held that statutes providing for jurisdiction over non-resi-
dent individuals by service on an agent in charge of the busi-
ness in that state were invalid. Brooks v. Dun, 51 Fed. 183
(C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1892); Aikman v. Sanderson, 122 La. 256, 47
So. 600 (1908). The rationale of these cases was that since the
state could not exclude the non-resident from doing business in
the state, it could not impose any conditions on him if he chose
to do business there. The leading case of Flexner v. Farson, 248
U. S. 289 (1919), held that the mere transaction of business in
a state by a non-resident individual did not imply consent to be
bound by the process of its courts through service on an agent.
It has become well settled that a state may make illegal the
doing of acts by a non-resident which endanger the safety of its
citizens, unless the non-resident consents to the jurisdiction of
its courts as to causes of action arising out of acts done within
the state. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927); Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916). Statutes providing that non-resi-
dent motorists using the highways of a state are deemed to have
appointed a state official as their agent to receive service of
process for causes of action arising out of this use have been
sustained as a valid exercise of the state's police power. Hess
v. Pawloski, supra. A statute providing for service on an agent
of a non-resident individual doing business in the state where
that business was corporate securities was sustained on the same
basis. Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935). The principle
has been extended by statute to the businesses of selling real
estate and insurance by the states of Louisiana and New York,
respectively. Thus it would seem that the weight of authority is
in favor of the validity of such statutes, and that a statute which
attempts to place residents and non-residents on a basis of equali-
ty is a reasonable exercise of the police power.
In the case of Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 (1899), a
non-resident of Iowa owned real estate therein. An Iowa statute
authorized a personal judgment against such an owner after a
proper assessment of a tax on the real estate. In setting aside a
personal liability imposed on the non-resident by the state court,
the court held that as the owner was at all times a non-resident
of the State of Iowa and had no personal notice or knowledge of
the assessment proceedings, that the imposition of a personal lia-
bility against him, in excess of the value of the real estate, was
violative of due process. Under the rule of this case, it would
seem that the principal case was correctly decided.
The rule of Dewey v. Des Moines, supra, was modified by the
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decision in Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934). In that
case the non-resident owner appeared generally to contest an in
rem action brought in the courts of Mississippi to satisfy an
assessment made without personal service. The court ruled that
there is no constitutional command that notice of the assessment
of a tax and opportunity to contest it must be given in advance
of the assessment, and that the requirements of due process are
satisfied if all available defenses may be presented to a compe-
tent tribunal before exaction of the tax and before the command
of the state to pay it becomes final and irrevocable. See also
Illinois v. Wilson-Car Lines, Inc., 369 Ill. 304, 16 N. E. 2d 757
(1938). Thus it would seem that if the courts of the State of
Ohio have jurisdiction to entertain an action by a sister state to
enforce against a non-resident thereof the amount of a tax levied
by it, the decision in the principal case might well have gone
the other way under the rule of Nickey v. Mississippi, supra, and
the sound theory that the residents and non-residents of a state
should be placed on a basis of equality. While the general rule
seems to be that the courts of one state cannot assist another
state in enforcing its revenue statutes and will not enter a judg-
ment on a tax claim which has not been previously reduced to
a judgment by the levying state, Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1120 (1775); Henry v. Sergeant, 13 N. I. 321 (1843); Colo-
rado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71 (1921); Moore v. Mitchell, 30 Fed.
2d 600 (1929), the rule might well be discarded in the light of
its origin and present rationale as is pointed out in a decision
wherein a court declined to follow it. It is significant that the
Supreme Court, although never expressly compelled to decide
its validity, has refused to acknowledge its soundness. Milwaukee
County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935).
William E. Rance
CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAW - DETERMINATION OF STATE AcTioN
Stuyvesant Town Corporation was organized under the New
York Redevelopment Companies Law, Mc. K. Unconsol. Laws,
sec. 3401 et. seq. Pursuant to the statute a contract with the
above corporation was approved by the City of New York con-
taining a plan for the rehabilitation of a substandard area con-
taining eighteen city blocks by the erection of thirty-five apart-
ment houses. The Corporation was to finance the entire project.
The City agreed to condemn the entire area and sell it to Stuy-
vesant. The contract gave tax exemption for twenty-five years
upon the enhanced value created by the project, regulated rents,
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prohibited sale and mortgaging of the property, and gave to the
city auditing privileges. The contract also required payment to the
city, upon dissolution of Stuyvesant, of any earned cash surplus
after a payment of a limited return to the Corporation. This
action was to enjoin Stuyvesant Town Corporation from refus-
ing plaintiffs any apartments in the project because of race or
color. Held, Refusal of the Corporation to consider applicants
as tenants because of race or color in the housing project was
not "state action" so as to violate the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Darsey v. Stuyvesant Town Cor-
poration, 299 N. Y. 535, 87 N. E. 2d 541 (1949).
It is a recognized principle of constitutional law that the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action
as distinguished from conduct of the individual no matter how
discriminatory. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875); James v. Bowman,
190 U. S. 127 (1902). In one of the earliest decisions considering
the matter, it was held that a state acted by its legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial authority. Ex. parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339
(1880). The doctrine was extended to include state authority in
the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
The concept of state action was expanded to include activi-
ties of private persons where their conduct was more than pure-
ly private conduct and could be called state action. Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1947). The clearest examples of this ex-
pansion are those cases in which the courts use the standard
tests of the agency-principal relationship to determine if certain
activities can be called state action and subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83
N. E. 2d 82 (1948). The case of Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73
(1931), is the foremost authority in this area and is followed by
a majority of the courts. In that case, Mr. Justice Cardozo said,
"The test is not whether the members . . . are representatives
of the State in the strict sense in which an agent is a repre-
sentative of his principal. The test is whether they are to be
classified as representatives of the State to such an extent and
in such a sense, that the great restraints of the Constitution set
limits to their action." He indicates that persons or associations
would be classified as such representatives if they acted in mat-
ters of high public interest and were invested with some author-
ity or power by the state, independent of their inherent author-
ity.
Later decisions have required only that a person or associa-
tion act in a matter of great public interest to be subject to
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the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith v. Alwright, 321 U. S. 649
(1943); Rice v. EImore, 165 F. 2d 387, cert. denied, 333 U. S.
875 (1946). Other courts have said that the use of some form
of state authority by a person or association would alone be suf-
ficient. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S.
517 (1946); Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co., 323
U. S. 192 (1944). Financial aid to a library corporation was
held to make it an instrumentality of the state, and its discrimi-
natory policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment even though
executive control was vested in a self-perpetuating board first
named by the donor of the library. Kerr et. al. v. Enoch Pratt
Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
A later refinement laid down by the United States Supreme
Court is that when the public has an interest in the acts of pri-
vate parties the constitutional and statutory rights of both would
be balanced to determine if the rights of the latter were cir-
cumscribed by those of the former. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S.
501 (1946).
The principal case sets forth the criteria for deciding whether
a particular course of conduct is state action, as being whether
the state has consciously exerted its power in the aid of dis-
crimination, or if persons or associations have acted in a gov-
ernmental capacity, recognized as such by the state.
The Court of Appeals of New York refused to follow Nixon
v. Condon, supra, and the line of authority built on it and made
an agency-principal relationship between a person and the state
a requirement to hold the conduct of such person subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The latest Ohio case to treat the subject was Culver v. City
of Warren, supra. The court, although using the tests of the
agency-principal relationship to determine that there was "state
action," recognized and approved the more liberal test developed
by the cases following Nixon v. Condon, supra. The adoption by
Ohio of this enlightened view would extend the great protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment and is to be strongly commended.
Donald H. Hauser
CONTRACT - INSURANCE PoLicy - OFFER To SETTLE CLAIm.
Plaintiff's truck was covered by a public liability insurance
policy issued by defendant company. This policy contained a
bodily injury liability limit of $6,000 for each person. The truck
was involved in an accident in which a young boy was injured.
An offer was made to settle the matter for $1,113 but defendant
refused. Two actions, personal injury and loss of services, were
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brought to recover $31,000. After the trial commenced, an offer
to settle for $4,000 was made and refused. The boy received a
judgment for $19,400 but still offered to settle everything for
$6,000. This was also refused. There was a remmittitur on ap-
peal and judgment was affirmed for $12,000. Plaintiff settled the
amount of the judgment over $6,000, the policy limit, for $3,600
and seeks to recover this amount from defendant. The verdict
was for the plaintiff but the trial court sustained a judgment
non obstante veredicto. Held, reversed and remanded. Although
defendant would not be liable for negligence in refusing to settle,
there was sufficient indication that defendant failed to act in
good faith. Hart v. Republic Mutual Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185,
87 N.E. 2d 347 (1949).
At the present time nearly all public liability insurance poli-
cies provide that the indemnity insurer has absolute control of
settlements and litigation of claims arising under the policy. The
insured is not permitted to settle the claim without the approval
of the indemnity company. This was adopted to prevent fraud
and collusion between the claimant and the insured. But in re-
turn, what protection should the insured have when the insurer
fails to accept an offer to compromise within the indemnity limit
and the chances are likely that the claimant will have a favor-
able verdict in excess of the face value of the policy? Several
theories have been advanced.
A large majority of the courts, as well as those of Ohio, ap-
pear to be consistent in holding that bad faith, fraud, or lack of
good faith by the insurer in failing or refusing to compromise a
claim subjects it to liability beyond the policy limits. New Or-
leans & C. R. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 La. 153, 38 So.
89 (1905); Best Building Co. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.,
247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928); Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fideli-
ty & D. Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081 (1916); Georgia Casualty
Co. v. Cotton Mills Products Co., 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931).
It has been held that the contract, per se, determines the
maximum liability of the insurer. Rumford Falls Paper Co. v.
Fidelity & C. Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 Atl. 503 (1893); dissent in Hart
-v. Republic Mutual Ins. Co., supra. Under this theory the parties
may insert any reasonable stipulations and conditions in the con-
tract provided they are not contrary to public policy. Thus the
insurer's option either to settle or to defend on behalf of the
insured is a legal right and it can not be subjected to excessive
liability merely by exercising its privilege of refusing to settle.
Some policies expressly provide that if the insurer had an op-
portunity, but refused, to settle a claim within the limits of the
policy, it shall then protect the insured from any judgment for
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a larger amount, also limited. Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Missis-
sippi Cent. R. Co., 116 Miss. 114, 76 So. 646 (1917).
Quaere: must the insurer exercise reasonable care in deter-
mining whether to accept an offer of settlement under pain of
subjecting itself to liability for negligence? Some of the more
liberal courts would answer this in the affirmative. Cavanaugh
v. General Accident F. & L. Assur. Corp., 79 N.H. 186, 106 Atl.
604 (1919); Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191
Pac. 583 (1920); Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1,
231 N.W. 257 (1930). In the Cavanaugh case, supra, the stand-
ard of reasonable care was imposed on the insurer in determin-
ing whether or not to accept an offer to compromise before suit.
The court took the view that when the insurer assumed control
of the claim a duty arose to do what the average man would
do in a similar situation. Under similar circumstances where
the insurer had exclusive control of the suit or settlement, the
agency theory was adopted by the court in Stowers Furniture
Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W. 2d 544 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1929). This court said that the insurer assumed the respon-
sibility to act as the agent of the insured and as such agent, in
determining whether an offer of settlement should be accepted,
"it ought to be held to that degree of care and diligence which
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the management
of his own business." 15 S.W. 2d 544, 547.
To impose a liability, for negligence would appear to place
an undue burden on the insurance companies. Liability for neg-
ligence in refusing to settle presupposes liability of the insured
and precludes any supposition of non-liability. Therefore, every
claim presented would have to be thoroughly investigated by the
insurer who would have to determine whether the insured is
liable to the claimant and for what amount. Every judgment
adverse to the insured in excess of the policy limits would sub-
ject the insurer to excess liability for mere negligence although
the insurer acted in good faith. Hindsight would necessarily be
applied and what was reasonable at the time of the proffered
settlement might become unreasonable in the light of the sub-
sequent judgment. Then too, if recovery for negligence is per-
mitted, there will undoubtedly be an increase in the cost of li-
ability insurance. In view of these arguments it would seem that
the court in the principal case reached a sound result.
Robert W. Phillips
CRnqIAL LAW- UsE oF DIRECTED VERDICT
Defendant and his wife were separated; she was employed in
another city as a waitress in a bar and grill. Defendant visited her
1950]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
periodically and on one of these occasions learned of her infidelity
to him. He went to his home, secured a revolver and shells, and
returned the following day. Defendant sought to persuade his wife
to return to him but she refused. There was some testimony that
she intended to meet another man after work and revealed this to
her husband. He then fired six shots from the revolver, killing her
instantly. To an indictment for murder in the first degree, defendant
pleaded not guilty. During the trial, before a jury, defendant ad-
mitted shooting his wife, but denied having any intent to kill her
when he obtained the revolver. At the conclusion of the trial the
court charged the jury that under the admissions made by the de-
fendant the evidence showed that homicide had been committed as
a matter of law and that it was for the jury to determine the de-
gree of the crime. The court submitted to the jury forms of verdict
for murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and
manslaughter. It refused to submit a form for a verdict of not guilty,
and stated that its action was predicated on the authority of Ross v.
State, 22 Ohio App. 304, 153 N.E. 865 (1926). After a short deliber-
ation the jury asked if not guilty was a possible verdict, to which
the court replied that it was not. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty of manslaughter. No appeal was taken by the defendant.
State v. Clay Patterson, Common Pleas Court of Franklin County,
Ohio, No. 30181, June 23, 1949, (Unreported).
It is a general rule that in criminal cases, where the defendant
pleads not guilty, the court has no power to direct a verdict of
guilty, even when the incriminating evidence is conclusive and un-
contradicted. Fouts v. State, 113 Ohio St. 450, 149 N. E. 551 (1925).
It has been held reversible error for the trial court to indicate to
the jury in any manner what its opinion may be on the facts or to
in any way attempt to coerce the jury in arriving at a verdict.
Zimmerman v. State, 42 Ohio App. 407, 182 N.E. 354 (1932). In a
prosecution for promoting a game of chance, the court improperly
directed a verdict against defendant although he in effect admit-
ted the elements of the crime charged. State v. Spivak, 28 Ohio
L. Abs. 446 (1938).
The accepted reason for this rule is that in a criminal trial the
court cannot set aside a verdict of acquittal. Hence, to permit it
to direct a verdict of guilty, would be to allow it to do indirectly
what it has no power to do directly. Therefore, the jury can not be
directed to render a verdict of guilty, no matter how convincing
the evidence may be, even where the facts are admitted or settled
beyond any possibility of dispute. UNDER=IL., CRUnvAL EvIDENCE
§483 (4th ed. 1935).
Should the court attempt to set aside a verdict of acquittal in
a criminal case and order the case retried its action would be in
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violation of the double jeopardy provision of Article I, Section 10
of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Budd, 65 Ohio St. 1, 60 N.E., 988
(1901).
The submission of forms of verdict to the jury by the court in
criminal cases has been a long accepted practice in Ohio. Mimms v.
State, 16 Ohio St. 221 (1865). Two issues involved in the instant
case are whether the trial court's action constituted a directed ver-
dict of guilty in a criminal case, and if so, whether or not such
practice is justifiable.
Failure to submit a form of not guilty was held not error in a
prosecution for first degree murder in which the defendant pleaded
not guilty. State v. Wells, 134 Ohio St. 404, 17 N.E. 2d 658 (1938).
In that case, however, counsel for the defendant in his argument to
the jury entered, for the purpose of the record, a plea of guilty.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the trial court's action did
not constitute a direction of a verdict of guilty since, under the
unusual circumstances of the case, the plea of guilty was made dur-
ing the trial thus eliminating the necessity for the court to submit
a not guilty form.
Despite the general rule, the action of the court in the principal
case is not without precedent in Ohio. The case of Ross v. State,
supra, on which the court relied in the principal case, arose out of
an indictment for murder in the first degree while attempting to
perpetrate a robbery. In the Ross case, the trial court refused to
submit to the jury a form of verdict of not guilty. On appeal the
court of appeals said, "The written confessions clearly show, and
the testimony of the defendant himself bears out, a conclusion
beyond a reasonable doubt that an unlawful homicide was com-
mitted by this defendant, and the court, in the form of a verdict
given by the jury, covered the essentials necessary for the rendition
of a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence."
Another Ohio court of appeals reached a similar result in a
case involving the manufacture of intoxicants contrary to law. De-
fendant having voluntarily testified and admitted every material
element of the crime charged in the indictment, the court directed
the jury to return a verdict of guilty. Lightfritz v. State, 7 Ohio L.
Abs. 197 (1929).
The prevailing federal rule is that in a criminal case the court
cannot direct a verdict of guilty even where the facts are admitted
beyond dispute, and the question of guilt or innocence depends
wholly upon a question of law which the court must determine.
United States v. Taylor, 11 Fed. 470 (C. C. D. Kan. 1882). [In an-
other case, the court disapproved of the directed verdict of guilty
against Susan B. Anthony who was charged with a violation of the
suffrage laws. United States v. Anthony, 11 Blatchf. 200, 24 Fed.
Cas. 829, No. 14459 (N.D.N.Y. 1873).] The judge is without power
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to charge as matter of law that any allegation is proved, even where
the evidence is clear and uncontradicted. Konda v. United States,
166 Fed. 91 (7th Cir. 1908); Blair et al v. United States, 241 Fed.
217 (9th Cir. 1917). See also the exhaustive historical background
in Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
It would seem that the limit to which the court can go is ex-
pressed in a 5-4 majority opinion of M~r. Justice Holmes in which it
is said that in a criminal case, when undisputed facts, including
testimony of the defendant, clearly establish the offense charged,
the judge may say so to the jury, tell them there is no issue of fact
for their determination and instruct them that, while they cannot be
constrained to return a verdict of guilty, it is their duty to do so
under their obligations as jurors. Homing v. District of Columbia,
254 U.S. 135 (1920).
The states as a whole may be said to take the position that it
is error for the court to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal case
in which the defendant pleads not guilty. The cases are discussed
in 72 A.L.R. 899 (1930); 53 Am. Jim. Trial § 407; 22 L.R.A. (n.s.)
305. To this general rule there are, however, exceptions which
must be noted.
The MVichigan courts distinguish between an instruction that
the defendant is to be found guilty and the direction of a verdict of
,guilty. When the facts are undisputed the cases hold that the trial
court may instruct the jury that it is their duty to bring in a ver-
dict of guilty against the defendant. People v. Newman, 85 Mich.
98, 48 N.W. 290 (1891); People v. Lathers, 228 Mich. 332, 197 N.W.
366 (1924). Nevertheless the court cannot coerce the jury into re-
turning a verdict of guilty. People v. Warren, 122 Mich. 504, 81
N.W. 360 (1899); People v. Remus, 135 Mich. 629, 98 N.W. 397
(1904); People v. Curry, 163 Mich. 180, 128 N.W. 213 (1910).
A more recent case seems to develop a rule consisting of a com-
bination of these two groups of cases. People v. Clark, 295 Mich.
704, 295 N.W. 370 (1940).
In a case involving a liquor law violation, an Arkansas court
has stated that the trial court may direct the jury to return a ver-
dict of guilty where the evidence is consistent and reasonable, the
witnesses unimpeached, and the evidence such that it would be
unreasonable for the jury to find the defendant not guilty. Paxton
v. State, 114 Ark. 393, 170 S.W. 80 (1914). One explanation for a
directed verdict of guilty under a charge of a misdemeanor is that
in cases where the punishment is by fine only, the court, having
the power to set aside a verdict of acquittal, also has the power to
direct a verdict of guilty where the facts are undisputed and guilt
is the only inference that can be legally drawn from them Huff v.
State, 164 Ark. 211, 261 S.W. 654 (1924); Rhodes v. Hope, 171 Ark.
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754, 286 S.W. 877 (1926). These cases rest on the proposition that
where the offense is a misdemeanor punishable by fine only, a sec-
ond trial after a verdict of acquittal by a jury does not violate the
double jeopardy provisions of the Arkansas Constitution. Jones v.
State, 15 Ark. 261 (1854); Taylor v. State, 36 Ark. 84 (1880).
The Supreme Judical Court of Massachusetts has said that in
a case submitted on agreed facts, where no question of law was in-
volved, it was not error for the court to direct a verdict of guilty.
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 241 Mass. 86, 134 N.E. 638 (1924);
Commonwealth v. Ross, 248 Mass. 15, 142 N.E. 791 (1924).
Despite these considered exceptions to the majority rule, it
would appear to be established that in the final analysis of a crimi-
nal case, in which the plea is not guilty, it is within the province of
the jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
this is particularly true where the accused is charged with a capi-
tal offense. Whether or not such a rule insures a logical result is
open to question. Assuming a case in which a defendant is charged
with first degree murder, he will in all probability plead not guilty,
although he may himself concede he is guilty of manslaughter. In
such a case, even though the evidence is clear and uncontradicted,
the jury, acting from mere whim or caprice in disregard of its moral
duty, may return a verdict of not guilty and enable the defendant
to escape unpunished. Surely this is not a desirable result and it
is fortunate that such cases are admittedly rare. In the principal
case there is no suggestion that in the final result justice was not
done. The action taken there, however, apparently stems from a
determination to guard against the escape of the guilty. In Ohio
we have no recent final determination of this question, but where
a choice must be made between protecting against the conviction
of the innocent and guarding against the escape of the guilty it
seems likely that most courts in other jurisdictions will choose
the former in preference to the latter.
Allen H. Bechtel
DoxmSTIc REIATIONS - JURISDICTION TO GRAM CUSTODY
WHm DIVORCE iS DENIED
Plaintiff, in the prayer of her petition for divorce, asked for
custody of her children, divorce, and general equitable relief. The
defendant filed a cross petition praying also for divorce, the custody
of the children and such other and further equitable relief as seemed
just and proper. The court denied both prayers for divorce, granted
the plaintiff custody of the children and ordered the defendant to
contribute to the support of the children. No appeal was taken
from this decision but in certiorari proceedings prosecuted by the
defendant as petitioner, his sole contention was that the court was
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without jurisdiction to make a decree concerning custody of the
children because a divorce was denied both parties. The Supreme
Court of Iowa sustained defendant's writ in a 5-3 decision, one
justice not sitting. Johnsara v. Levis, 38 N.W. 2d 115 (Iowa 1949).
It has been held many times in the past that a court cannot is-
sue a decree awarding custody of children if it does not in the same
action grant a divorce. The argument supporting this view is that
the jurisdiction of the court is purely statutory, and such relief
cannot be given unless so provided in the statute. Courts so hold-
ing, however, do not deny their jurisdiction to fix custody in a
subsequent proceeding by habeas corpus or in a subsequent suit
in equity. 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND AN mENT § 15.34 (2d ed.
1945). Thus two separate actions are required, usually before the
same tribunal which could just as easily have settled all of the is-
sues in the first instance. As a consequence, the modern trend is
to grant the custody of the children to one of the parties even though
a divorce is denied. These decisions rest, however, upon a statute
expressly conferring such power, or where the statute does not so
provide, upon general equity powers of the court. 2 SCHOULER,
MARRIAGE AN DIVORCE § 1882 (6th ed. 1921). One author finds this
changing viewpoint exemplified by statutes relating to the care,
custody and maintenance of children of parents living in a state of
separation without divorce. His research discloses that about 36
states have such express statutes. 2 VERNIER, DIVORCE AN SEPA-
RATION § 142 (1932).
In the principal case the majority found that "the conclusion is
inescapable" that the legislature intended no adjudication of custo-
dial rights in a divorce proceeding in the absence of a legal sepa-
ration, relying on Iowa Code Section 598.14 (1946) which provides:
"When a divorce is decreed, the court may make such order in re-
lation to children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the
parties as shall be right." They found the implication to be certain
when read in connection with Iowa Code Section 668.1 (1946)
which says: "Parents are the natural guardians of the persons of
their minor children and equally entitled to their care and custody."
The court's conclusions in the principal case do not seem to
follow necessarily; nor do previous decisions of the Iowa Supreme
Court necessarily dictate this result. Goecker v. Goecker, 227
Iowa 697, 288 N.W. 884 (1939); MoUring v. Molilring, 184 Iowa 464,
167 N. W. 524 (1918); Porter v. Porter, 190 Iowa 1126, 181 N.W. 393
(1921); Garrett v. Garrett, 114 Iowa 439, 87 N.W. 282 (1901); State
v. Kirkpatrick, 54 Iowa 373, 6 N.W. 588 (1880); nor have other
jurisdictions found this holding to be the sounder one: Davis v.
Davis, 194 Miss. 343, 12 So. 2d 435 (1943); Power v. Power, 65
N.J. Eq. 93, 55 Atl. 111 (1903).
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Justice Garfield, dissenting in the principal case, queried what
possible difference it could make in the maintenance of the home
or family whether the issue of custody was determined by respon-
dent as it was here, in a proceeding in which divorce was asked but
denied, or in habeas corpus where no divorce was asked. It was
his opinion that, at best, the question involved was merely one of
procedure and not, as the majority held, one of power or jurisdic-
tion in the court.
The majority, in distinguishing an earlier decision, Mollring v.
Molring, supra, seem to take the interesting position that if the
issue of custody had been raised independently and not incidentally
to the divorce suit, then there would have been no objection to the
district court's jurisdiction. However, in Moltring v. Molring the
court said that plaintiff's paraphrasing of this statute, now Iowa
Code Section 598.14 (1946), to mean that such orders may be made
only if a divorce is decreed cannot be sustained. The court, in this
case, correctly refused to indulge in the useless act of declaring
that it would not pass upon the matter, knowing full well that it
would still have the same controversy to settle after the litigants
had worked their way back into the court through other channels!
It then went on to point out that though the district court while
entertaining a divorce suit may thus be limited, it does not follow
that the court had no inherent equitable power to deal with the
custody of infants.
The applicable Mississippi code provision, Miss. Code Section
1421 (1930), is quite similar to that of the Iowa code. The Miss-
issippi Supreme Court, rather than construing this statute to be a
restriction on the divorce courts, in fact considers it as enlarging
the jurisdiction of the chancery court. Davis v. Davis, supra.
The Ohio code provision, Ohio General Code Section 8032
provides in part, "When husband and wife are living sepa-
rate and apart from each other or are divorced and the ques-
tion as to care, custody, and control of the offspring of their mar-
riage is brought before a court of competent jurisdiction in this
state, they shall stand upon an equality as to care, custody, and
control of such offspring, so far as it relates to their being either
father or mother thereof." This section has been the basis for de-
cisions in Ohio Courts of Appeal which follow the more consonant
view of allowing the divorce courts jurisdiction to settle questions
of custody of children once they have been brought before the
tribunal and fully litigated. Mathews v. Mathews, 37 Ohio L. Abs.
283, 46 N.E. 2d 833 (1940); South v. South, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 594
(1927); Patterson v. Patterson, 12 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 601, (1912);
Cadwell v. Cadwell, 32 Ohio C.D. 266 (1911).
In a code state such as Iowa, where technical forms of action
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have been abolished, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, Division IV,
section 67, and where "A single plaintiff may join in the same
petition as many causes of action, legal or equitable, independent
or alternative, as he may have against a single defendant.", Iowa
Rules of Civil Procedure, Division II C. Rule 22, there seems to be
slight justification for a result which causes circuity of action, need-
less additional expense to the parties, and inconvenience to the
courts, without at the same time safeguarding any substantial
rights.
James H. Tilberry
HABEAS CoRPus - FDERAL TERpRiOAL JURISDICTION
Petitioner, a citizen of the United States, arrested in Tokyo,
Japan, on a criminal charge, tried in that country by an American
general provost court, and sentenced to imprisonment, seeks a writ
of habeas corpus to be directed to the Secretary of Defense, et aL
Held, Motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction denied. In re Bush,
84 Y. Supp. 873 (D.C. 1949).
According to a federal jurisdictional statute, the judges of the
federal courts have power, within their respective jurisdictions, to
grant writs of habeas corpus. Rev. Stat. 752 (1875), 28 U.S.C.
§ 452 (1946), now 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1948). "Within their respective
jurisdiction" has reference to the territorial jurisdiction, Ex parte
Kenyon, 5 Dill 385, 14 Fed. Cas 452, No. 7,720 (C.C. Ark. 1878),
and the power to issue writs of habeas corpus is expressly restricted
to the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which the application
is made. Ex parte Gouyet, 175 Fed. 230 (D.C. Mont. 1909). In the
federal courts a prisoner must be detained within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court from which he asks relief by habeas corpus.
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1947). To what forum, then, if any,
could Americans residing or stationed outside the United States
or its organized territories present petitions for habeas corpus?
Not to the Supreme Court, for it has denied that it has jurisdiction
to issue a writ upon petition of a person confined outside the United
States. Ex parte Betz, 329 U.S. 672 (1946).
This statutory jurisdictional omission had been a topic of little
discussion prior to World War II. A flood of litigation over official
action by the Federal Government in areas outside of the United
States has, however, focused attention upon the problem of what
process, if any, a person confined in an area not subject to the juris-
diction of any district court may employ to assert federal rights.
This question is reserved in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 192
(1947).
That federal jurisdiction be co-extensive with governmental
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action by United State officials cannot be denied, for otherwise,
such action beyond the jurisdictional limitation would be immune
from judical power and obviate the necessity for compliance with
the Constitution.
A statutory defect led to the problem; one cure may well have
been by appropriate legislation. Congress failed to act, but not the
judiciary. When a person is deprived of his liberty by the act
of an official of the United States outside the territorial juris-
diction of any district court of the United States, that person's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus will lie in the district court
which has territorial jurisdiction over the officials who have di-
rective power over the immediate jailer. Eisentrager v. Forrestal,
174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949). To be distinguished are those cases
wherein the court determined it had no jurisdiction, not for the
reason that original jurisdiction was lacking, but for the reason
that a foreign tribunal could not be reviewed. Flick v. Johnson,
174 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
In the principal case, after deciding that the American gen-
eral provost court is a tribunal of the United States to which
an international commission has ceded criminal jurisdiction, the
court was bound by the ruling in the Eisentrager case, which
ruling, based not on statutes and cases, but instead on funda-
mental principles, seems to be the practical way out of this jur-
isdictional difficulty.
Richard M. Christiansen
MAArUS - CONMOL OF JUDIcLAL DIscRETIoN
Relator was the unsuccessful defendant in a partition suit
instituted by her husband to sell a house which they owned
jointly. The decision against the wife was affirmed by the court
of appeals. One month after the affirmance of the trial court's
order of sale the wife began an action for divorce and alimony
in which she asked that the court issue a temporary restraining
order under Ohio General Code Section 11996(1938) to prevent
the husband from selling the house. Upon the court's refusal to
enjoin the husband, the wife filed a petition in the Ohio Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus praying that the trial judge be
compelled to issue the temporary restraining order, and also
praying for general relief. Held, (4-3) writ denied. The entire
court agreed that to compel the issuance of the temporary re-
straining order would be to control the discretion of the respon-
dent judge in violation of Ohio General Code Section 12285
(1938) and counter to the accepted rule. State ex rel. Shively
v. Nicholas, 151 Ohio St. 179, 84 N.E. 2d 918 (1949).
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Ohio General Code Section 12285 (1938) declares: "The writ
may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment, or
proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, but it cannot
control judicial discretion." This is a restatement of the settled
common law rule. Where the issue of the writ of mandamus
would result in the control of judicial discretion it is every-
where denied. It is equally well settled that the writ may be
used to compel the judge of an inferior court to exercise the
discretion with which he is endowed. Matter of Samuel Kazer,
5 Ohio 545 (1832); State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 69 Ohio St. 196;
68 N.E. 1044 (1903).
The writ of mandamus properly lies in cases where the in-
ferior court refuses to take jurisdiction where by law it ought
to do so, or where, having obtained jurisdiction in a cause, it
refuses to proceed in due exercise thereof. Ex parte Parker,
120 U.S. 737 (1887).
The respondent, in the principal case, denied the temporary
restraining order partly on the ground that the court of appeals
had "already passed upon the merits of the case and disposed
of the issues before said parties." The dissenting judges took the
view that the respondent had thus refused to exercise his dis-
cretion on the basis of a mistaken legal assumption that he had
no power to hear the supposedly already-adjudicated matters.
Actually, the issues which the relator sought to raise in the di-
vorce action as grounds for her request for a temporary restrain-
ing order under Ohio General Code Section 11996(1938) had
been offered by her as defendant in the partition suit, but had
been struck from the pleadings as "irrelevant, immaterial, and
not any defense," and accordingly had not been passed upon.
The dissenting opinion urged that mandamus should issue under
respondent's prayer for general relief, not to compel the issuance
of the temporary restraining order, but to order the respondent
judge to pass on the issues which he erroneously believed he
was without power to hear.
If an inferior tribunal has erroneously decided that it is with-
out jurisdiction to hear a case properly before it most courts
will issue mandamus ordering the inferior tribunal to proceed
with the action. Matter of W. P. Connaway, 178 U. S. 421(1900);
Taylor v. Montcalm, 122 Mich. 692, 81 N.W. 965 (1900); State
ex rel. Smith v Smith, supra; Runk v. Thomas, 200 N. Y. 447,
94 N.E. 363 (1911). A few jurisdictions will not compel a lower
court to proceed when it has decided, although erroneously, that
it has no jurisdiction over the case before it, and others hold
that, if the question of jurisdiction before the inferior court is
one of fact, mandamus will not lie, Speckert v. Ray, 166 Ky. 622,
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179 S.W. 592 (1915); but if it is one of law, erroneously decided,
mandamus will be issued. Gilbert v. Shaver, 91 Ark. 231, 120
S.W. 833 (1900). Although the writ may issue to compel the
lower court to exercise its discretion, the usual statement is
that it will not be used to compel the exercise of discretion in
a specific manner, nor to revise a judicial act once it has been
taken. State ex rel. Keller v. Waite, 70 Ohio St. 149, 71 N.E.
286(1904). Accordingly the writ has been denied where the re-
lator asked that the respondent judge be ordered to sustain a
motion, State ex rel. Mann v. Floyd, 138 Ohio St. 253, 34 N.E. 2d
196 (1941); or to change the date on an order of probate, State
ex rel. Frye v. Mac Conkey, 136 Ohio St. 462, 26 N.E. 2d 457
(1940). However, mandamus has been used to compel a court
to act in a particular way when its refusal so to act was based
on the assumption that it lacked jurisdiction and that assump-
tion was erroneous. Thus, mandamus has issued to compel a
lower court to hear a motion for a new trial, State ex rel. Hiett
v. Com. Pl. Court, 102 Ohio St. 40, 130 N.E. 36 (1921); to sign a
bill of exceptions, State ex rel Otenburger v. Hawes, 43 Ohio St.
16, 1 N.E. 1 (1885); and to "accept surety," State ex rel. Tod v.
Com. Pl. Court, 15 Ohio St. 377 (1864).
The use of mandamus is limited to circumstances in which
there is no specific and adequate remedy by appeal or error
proceedings. State ex rel. v. Village of Botkin, 141 Ohio St. 437,
48 N.E. 2d 865 (1943); In re Morrison, 147 U.S. 14, (1892); Hitch-
cock v. Wayne, 144 Mich. 362, 107 N.W. 1123 (1906). However,
mandamus has been allowed even though review or appeal was
available, where prompt action was necessary to avoid hardship
and appeal was not sufficiently speedy. Matter of Skinner, 265
U.S. 86 (1924); Hill v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 307, 114 Pac.
805 (1911).
If, in the principal case, the respondent judge's denial of the
relator's request for a temporary restraining order was for er-
roneous reasons, it is not unlike a dismissal for erroneous rea-
sons. Each appears to be a judicial act; each is done on a
mistaken assumption that the court is without jurisdiction to
hear the cause. True, the dismissal for erroneously assumed
want of jurisdiction is said to be a preliminary matter, while
the respondent's refusal in the instant case occurred after the
court had assumed jurisdiction over the divorce action; yet in
each instance the purpose of the mandate would be to compel
the inferior court to exercise its discretion and to take jurisdic-
tion which it believes itself not to have.
The federal courts have adopted the view that mandamus will
not lie unless the inferior court refused ab initio to take juris-
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diction, but there is a weighty contention that the federal deci-
sions on this issue are induced by statutes. See collection of cases
in 4 A. L. R. 592 (1919).
The dissenters were of the opinion that an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law was not available in the prin-
cipal case. No final order had been given in the divorce action
from which the relator could have appealed, and to maintain
the status quo during the divorce action would appear necessary
if the relator's rights in her home were to be protected.
The rule stated by the majority opinion in the principal case
cannot be controverted. Mandamus will not be used to control
the discretion of an inferior court. It would appear, however,
that when the facts indicate that a tribunal has refused some
course of action solely because that court mistakenly believes
that it has no jurisdiction to hear the reasons supporting a re-
quest for that action, it should be compelled by a writ of man-
damus to hear those reasons.
Joseph S. Wise
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - RiGHTs OF HOLDER-PAYEE AGAINST
THE DRAWEE.
An agent of the payee received from the drawer six checks
drawn on the defendant-bank. He indorsed the checks without
authority, presented them to defendant-bank, received payment,
and absconded. Plaintiff-payee sued the drawee-bank alleging
conversion of the checks by the drawee-bank. Held, Payee has
no cause of action in conversion. Strickland Transportation Com-
pany v. First State Bank of Memphis, 147 Tex. 193, 214 S.W. 2d
934 (1948).
Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the
payment of a check on an unauthorized or forged indorsement,
and the charging of the drawer's account did not constitute an
acceptance which would make the drawee bank liable to the
payee. First National Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 (1876);
Houston Grocer Co. v. Farmer's Bank, 71 Mo. App. 132 (1897);
Sims v. Bank, 98 Ark. 1, 135 S. W. 356 (1911); Rauch v. Bank,
143 Ill. App. 625 (1908). Contra: Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380,
12 S.W. 919 (1890); McFadden v. Fotlrath, 114 Minn. 85, 130
N.W. 542 (1911).
Whatever doubt there may be left as to the soundness of
the conclusion reached in the cases last cited would seem to be
removed by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Section
132, which is applicable to bills, and Section 185, which applies
to checks, provide that an acceptance 'must be in writing and
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signed by the drawee." Accordingly, when these operative facts
have not been existent (principal case), the payee has failed to
recover on an acceptance theory. Blacker & Shepard Co. v.
Granite Trust Co., 284 Mass. 9, 187 N.E. 53 (1933); Lone Star
Trucking Co. v. City National Bank of Commerce, 240 S.W. 1000
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922); State Bank of Chicago v. Mid City Trust
& Savings Bank, 296 M1l. 599, 129 N.E. 498 (1920). Contra:
Chamberlin Co. v. Bank of Pleasantown, 98 Kan. 611, 160 Pac.
1138 (1916) (decided under the Negotiable Instruments Law by
applying Section 137.) The case last cited is commented on
adversely in Note, 38 YALE L. J. 1143 (1928), and there seem
to be no other decisions which hold that mere payment and
charge-off can be a "constructive" acceptance under the Negoti-
able Instruments Law. But see, Bull v. Novice State Bank, 250
S.W. 232, 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). There is, of course, a pos-
sibility of an acceptance under Section 137 in cases of actual
destruction or detention.
Some courts have permitted recovery on the theory that the
holder was an assignee of the claim of the drawer against the
drawee. This is sound under Section 189 provided there is evi-
dence of an intention of the drawer to assign other than the fact
that the check was drawn and delivered, because under Section
189 the drawing of a check is not "of itself' an assignment.
Dolph v. Cross, 153 Iowa 289, 133 N.W. 669 (1911); Greunther
v. Bank of Monroe, 90 Neb. 280, 133 N.W. 902 (1911).
Sometimes it is claimed that the payee can recover from the
drawee bank, after the improper payment, on the theory of
money had and received to the use of the holder. There was
a dictum to this effect in Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10
Wall. 152 (U. S. 1869), and this dictum has been applied and
followed. Seventh National Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. St. 483 (1873);
Van Libber v. Louisiana Bank, 14 La. Ann. 481 (1859), since
overruled by In re M. Feitel House Wrecking Co., 159 La. 752,
106 So. 292 (1925). But the majority of cases are opposed to
recovery on this ground. Lanier v. State Savings Bank, 149 Mich.
483, 112 N.W. 1119 (1907); Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. First
National Bank, 102 Va. 753, 47 S.E. 837 (1904); Clark & Co. v.
Savings Bank, 31 Pa. Super. 647 (1906). See BRiTrow, HADBOOK
OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES § 146 (1943), where the sound-
ness of this theory is questioned.
While it is well settled that in these cases of wrongful pay-
ment the holder-payee has no remedy against the drawee as
upon a contract in fact, it is equally well settled that the hold-
er may have a remedy ex delicto. The action is one in the
nature of trover for conversion of the instrument. Blacker &
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Shephard Co. v. Granite Trust Co., supra; Louisville & N. R. Co.
v. Citizens' & People's National Bank of Pensacola, 74 Fla. 385,
77 So. 104 (1917); Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co. v.
Dunavan, 205 Ky. 801, 266 S.W. 667 (1924); Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Bear Butte Valley Bank, 63 S.D. 262, 257 N.W.
642 (1934); Yarborough v. People's National Bank, 162 S.C. 332,
160 S.E. 844 (1931). See Aigler, Rights of Holder of Bill of Ex-
change Against the Drawee, 38 HARv. L. REv. 857 (1925); Notes,
69 A. L. R. 1076 (1930), 137 A. L. R. 874 (1942). Contra: Gordon
Fireworks Co. v. Capital National Bank, 236 Mich. 271, 210 N.W.
263 (1926). Disapproved in Note, 25 MiCH. L. REv. 454 (1926).
As was stated in State v. First National Bank of Albuquerque,
38 N.M. 225, 30 P. 2d 728, 732 (1934), "Recovery on facts amount-
ing to a conversion may not correctly be hypothesized on the idea
that the bank has misappropriated any moneys or funds belong-
ing to the payee. Were such a condition of recovery, properly,
he should fail. It is the conversion by the bank of the payee's
property, the check, which gives rise to the action." (Emphasis
supplied). In the Gordon case, supra, the court replied to the
plaintiff's argument that the declaration had a count for con-
version by stating, "The bank did not convert funds of plaintiff."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The measure of damages is prima facie the face value of the
instrument. Bentley, Murray & Co. v. La Salle Trust & Savings
Bank, 197 IMI. App. 322 (1916); BRANNAN, NEGOTIALE INSTRU-
MENTS LAw § 189 (7th ed. Beutel, 1948). And in a number of
cases, the payee has been permitted to waive the tort and sue
in assumpsit. James v. Union National Bank, 238 IlM. App. 159
(1925); Farmers & People's Bank, 100 Tenn. 187, 47 S.W. 234
(1897).
In several cases, the courts, without indicating the theory or
discussing the form of action, have held that the drawee-bank is
liable to the true payee. Robinson v. Bank of Winslow, 42 Ind.
App. 350, 85 N.E. 793 (1908); Deering & Co. v. Kelso, 74 Minn.
41, 76 N.W. 792 (1898), and cases cited Note, 14 A. L. R. 764,
768 (1921).
In the principal case the court felt bound by Fidelity Deposit
Co. v. Fort Worth National Bank, 65 S.W. 2d 276 (Tex. Com. of
App., 1933), an earlier Texas case denying recovery to the payee
on a conversion theory. Prior to the Fidelity Deposit Co. case,
supra, the law in Texas gave the payee a cause of action on this
theory. City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Pyramid Asbestos &
Roofing Co., 39 S.W. 2d 1101 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931); Pierce Pe-
troleum Co. v. Guaranty Bond State Bank, 22 S.W. 2d 520 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1929). The Fidelity Deposit Co. case, supra, was based
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on Section 189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Since the
bank has not accepted the check, there is no assignment of the
funds of the drawer, and therefore the payee has no right or
interest in the funds on which to base a cause of action against
the drawee bank in conversion.
But it is submitted that the handling of the instrument itself
in a manner inconsistent with the payee's title thereto, is a con-
version on which to base the recovery. Blacker & Shephard Co.
v. Granite Trust Co., supra; State v. First National Bank of Albu-
querque, supra.
It also has been pointed out that the result in the principal
case has the effect of causing a circuity of action, since the draw-
er of the check may require the bank to restore its credit, BlRT-
TON, HADBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILs Ai NoTEs § 142 (1943),
and the payee still has his right of action on the check against
the drawer, Note, 26 COL. L. REV. 113 (1926). It would seem
desirable, then, to allow the payee to recover directly against
the bank.
In Ohio, it appears likely, that an attempted recovery in con-
version would be denied. The Supreme Court in The Elyria Sav-
ings & Banking Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 92 Ohio St. 406, 111 N.E.
147 (1915) said, "We are of the opinion that when the legislature
enacted Section 8294 [Section 189, Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law] it intended to cover the subject of the liability of a
bank to the holder of a check. It prescribed when and when
only there is liability to the holder. In absence of the conditions
therein prescribed no right of action exists in favor of the hold-
er." Although the right of recovery in conversion was not dis-
cussed, the language of the opinion is sufficiently sweeping, as
indicated above, to be taken as precluding a recovery on that
ground. Until the Ohio Supreme Court is called upon to ren-
der a decision in a case wherein there is found an allegation
for conversion of the instrument, the law in Ohio will remain
in some doubt.
George W. Stuhldreher
TAXES, INHERITANCE - ADOPTED CHILD.
Testator died survived by a daughter and a son, which son
had an adopted son who is the present plaintiff. The testator's
will left the estate to the Cleveland Trust Company as trustee
of a trust inter vivos, the corpus to be treated as if composed of
two equal shares, one for the benefit of each child in his respec-
tive lifetime. The trust agreement further provided that upon the
death of the children the trust should pass to the then living
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lineal descendants of the children, including adopted children spe-
cifically. The probate court found that both children would die
without issue, and that both would be survived by the adopted
child. The court then held the plaintiff did not come under the
second classification of Ohio General Code Section 5334 (tax
statute) as a lineal descendant and taxed the estate in its entire-
ty. Held, reversed. The plaintiff is a "lineal descendant" of the
testator, capable of inheriting through, as well as from, the adopt-
ing parent, and entitled to $3500 exemption of class two of Ohio
General Code Section 5334. In re Estate of Friedman: Cleveland
Trust Co. v State, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 22 (1949).
In reaching this conclusion the court stated the tax statute
and the adoption statute, Ohio General Code Section 10512-23,
are in pari materia. Laws pari materia, or concerning the same
subject matter, are to be construed in reference to each other.
Bouvi 's LAw DrcTIoN rY 2454 (1946). The court further stated
that the effect of Ohio General Code Section 10512-19 (now Code
Section 10512-23), passed in 1932, was to give an adopted child
a status not held prior to the enactment of the amendment. Flynn
v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E. 2d 75 (1946); White v.
Meyer, 66 Ohio App. 549, 37 N.E. 2d 546 (1940).
The rights of inheritance of an adopted child have been the
subject of much legislation as well as litigation in this jurisdic-
tion. Numerous decisions have been handed down during the
years and whenever the courts have limited or restricted the
rights which an adopted child acquires by reason of the adop-
tion, the legislature has promptly spoken to enlarge or clarify
such rights. In this particular instance it is clear that the old
rule of construction, that statutes in derogation of the common
law shall be strictly construed, has no application to the third
or remedial part of the Ohio General Code. Onro Gr. CODE,
§ 10214 (1938). After the courts held that a child could inherit
from, but not through, the adoptive parents, construing former
Ohio General Code Section 8030, the legislature passed Ohio
General Code Section 10512-19. It is presumed that a statutory
amendment is intended to effect some change. Lytle v. Baldinger,
84 Ohio St. 1, 95 N.E. 389 (1911); Ohio Valley Electric Ry. Co.
v. Hagerty, 14 Ohio App. 398 (1921). Also, when the legislature
repeals a law soon after its construction by the courts, a pre-
sumption arises that the legislature intended to override that
construction. State v. Brown, 108 Ohio St. 454, 141 N.E. 69 (1923).
It would seem that the ultimate effect of all this would be to
clothe the adopted child with the same rights that a natural child
enjoys, save as to inheritance expressly limited to heirs of the
blood of the adoptive parent. Frame v. Shaffer, 39 Ohio Abs. 617
(C.P. 1943).
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However the courts have strenuously resisted this change in
Ohio. "We are not of the opinion that the legislature by that
section intended to make an adopted child an heir of the entire
blood stream coursing through the veins of the adopting parent
and all of its tributaries." Central Trust Co. v. Hart, 82 Ohio
App. 450, 80 N.E. 2d 920 (1948). "We do not find in any Ohio
statute, either present or past, provision that the adopted child
shall inherit through its adoptive parent from such adoptive par-
ent's collateral relations. We do not so construe the present
statute, Section 10512-19, General Code." Southern Ohio Savings
Bank and Trust Co. v. Boyer, 66 Ohio App. 136, 31 N.E. 2d 161
(1940). In a case exactly like the Friedman case, supra, with
the same statutes in force, the court came to the opposite con-
clusion saying, "The court is unable to agree with the contention
that the present adoption law, regardless of its enlargement of
the scope of inheritance, places the adopted daughter of a natural
daughter on the same footing as a granddaughter in respect to
the exemption provided for in this respect." In re Estate of
Harriet C. Griffin, 19 Ohio Ops. 377 (1935). See also to the same
effect, Reinhard v. Reinhard, 23 Ohio Abs. 306 (1936).
It is not strange that the courts have taken the strict view
in construing the inheritance statutes regarding adopted children.
At the present time a majority of jurisdictions follow the rule
that an adopted child can inherit from, but not through, the
adopting parent. 38 A. L. R. 8 (1925); 120 A. L. R. 837 (1939);
1 Am. JuR. 837; Anam sON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or Wn.Ls 68
(1937); MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND Do-
mESTIc RELATIoNs 362 (1931). There is, however, a sizeable mi-
nority opposed to that position. Id. In view of the fact that "this
variation is due to the diverse interpretations given to the dif-
ferent adoption statutes, based to a large extent upon the word-
ing of these statutes," 120 A. L. R. 839 (1939), it would seem
that any comparison based on the majority or minority rule is
of little value. Behind the rigidness of strict construction lies
the principle that consanguinity is favored in a determination of
heirship. To allow an adopted child, an artificial relationship
created by statute, to share equally with a blood relative when
inheriting from collateral relatives of adoptive parents is not con-
sonant with the general rules of inheritance. But there are signs
that this tendency is decreasing to some extent, "The trend of
recent decisions has been to extend rather than to restrict the
right of inheritance of an adopted child." In re Hecker's Estate,
33 N.Y.S. 2d 365 (1942).
In Ohio, the issue now should be well fixed. The case of
Flynn v. Bredbeck, supra, is the most authoritative direct hold-
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ing since the passage of the statute. There the court, through
Judge Zimmerman, stated, "By the terms of former Section 10512-
19, General Code (114 Ohio Laws 474), reciting that an adopted
child shall be capable of inheriting property expressly limited
by will or by operation of law to the child, heir or next of kin
of the adopting parent, an adopted child was enabled to inherit
property through as well as from his adopting parent whether
such property passed by will or by operation of law." See also
to the same effect, MCCLELLAD, ADAMs & HOSFORD - OHO PRO-
BATE PRACTICE 1222; DrE.EL, OHIO PROBATE LAW 602 (4th Ed.
1948); LAMNECK, OHIO PROBATE DIGEST & PRACTICE MANUAL §
794 (3rd Ed. 1937); 8 OHIO ST. L. J. 113 (1941); 7 OHIO ST. L. J.
441 (1941). But cf. 4 OHIO ST. L. J. 97 (1937). It would seem
that the principal case carries the principle to its logical con-
clusion, in holding that an adopted child is on the same footing
as a natural one, except where specifically stated, as regards
the sovereign as well as competing heirs. "The statute must be
interpreted with the degree of liberality essential to the attain-
ment of the intent of the legislature." In re Friedman, supra, at
p. 27.
John A. Brown
ADm~-ISTRATIE LAW- REs JUDiCATA
The Securities and Exchange Commission (herein referred to
as SEC) conducted extensive hearings in investigating alleged
fraud of an investment firm. In order to secure testimony of
the firm's attorneys, the SEC brought a subpoena enforcement
action in federal district court seeking to prove fraud so as to
pierce the attorney-client privilege. The SEC filed the record
of its investigation. The court held that the evidence did not
make the requisite prima facie showing of fraud to pierce the
privilege. After this decision the SEC gave the firm notice of a
hearing to determine, (1) suspension or revocation of broker-
dealer registration, and (2) suspension or explusion from the
National Association of Securities Dealers, on the basis of its
investigation of the fraud. The firm then sought to enjoin the
hearing, alleging that the judgment in the subpoena enforcement
action was res judicata as to any further action by the SEC on
the investigation record. The district court dismissed the bill.
The circuit court reversed, holding that res judicata applied. The
SEC appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, judgment reversed.
Res judicata will not be applied to prevent the operation of the
rule that the administrative remedy must -be exhausted before
one is entitled to review by the courts. SEC, Hanrahan et at v.
Otis & Co., 70 S. Ct. 89 (1949).
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Rules governing the relationship of courts to administrative
agencies are not well settled and the decisions concerning the
general problem of reviewability, of which res judicata is a part,
reflect this confusion. On the one hand, it is necessary to allow
administrative agencies freedom to carry on their complex func-
tions, and on the other hand, it is imperative that individuals
be protected from arbitrary orders. Prior to the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. §1001 et seq., there
was little statutory guidance and the courts were left to develop
the rules for reviewability. Certain limitations were established.
Findings of fact by administrative agencies based on substantial
evidence are non-reviewable. Nat'l Labor Relations Board v.
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292 (1939);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Nati Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S.
229 (1936); Applachian Electric Power Co. v. Nat'I Labor Rela-
tions Board, 93 F. 2d 985 (4th Cir. 1938); Natl Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 97 F. 2d 13 (6th Cir. 1938). No
one is entitled to judicial relief until the administrative remedy
is exhausted. Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461 (1931);
United States v. Illinois Central R.R., 291 U. S. 457 (1933); Hege-
man Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163 (1934); Farncomb
v. Denver, 252 U. S. 7 (1919); Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dis-
trict, 262 U. S. 710 (1922).
In passing the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress at-
tempted to set out definite rules governing reviewability. 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009. Section 10 (c) provides that every agency action made
reviewable by statute and every final agency action for which
there is no adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to
judicial review. This broad provision is subject to important
limitations, however, for the Act reads that Section 10 (c) ap-
plies, "Except in so far as (1) Statutes preclude judicial review,
and (2) Agency action is by law committed to administrative
discretion."
The question of whether the courts will apply the res judi-
cata doctrine to protect the determinations of their review, by
halting a subsequent administrative proceeding, has not frequent-
ly arisen. "Ordinarily a court decision will be res judicata in a
later administrative proceeding in the same circumstances in
which it would be res judicata in a later judicial proceeding."
Davis, Res Judicata In Administrative Law, 25 TEXAS L. REv.
199, 246 (1947). The view that res judicata should so apply has
found some support. Safeway Stores v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 656
(Em. Ct. App. 1946); Lee v. Federal Trade Commission, 113 F.
2d 583 (8th Cir. 1940).
The headnote of Safeway Stores v. Porter, supra, reads, "Un-
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der principles of res judicata, a chain retail food store operator
seeking to review and set aside a maximum price regulation
promulgated by the Federal Price Administrator was estopped
from raising a second time in the same court a ground of ob-
jection which such court had previously decided against the store
operator."
The decision in Lee v. Federal Trade Commission, supra, is
very similar. In the first action, the government brought libel
for condemnation of a quantity of product on the ground that
it was misbranded. Judgment was for the manufacturer. Later
the FTC instituted proceedings charging the same party with
use of unfair methods of competition by soliciting the sale of its
product by false and misleading statements. The court found
that the underlying issue was the same in both suits and held
that judgment for the manufacturer in the first action was res
judicata as to the falsity of the representations and could not
be collaterally attacked in the second action.
The instant case may be distinguished from the above cited
cases on the ground that the plaintiff is seeking to raise the
issue of res judicata affirmatively, by injunction, rather than de-
fensively. In judicial proceedings a court will refuse to enjoin
an action on the ground that the plaintiff has a defense of res
judicata. Plews v. Burrage, 266 Fed. 347 (1st Cir. 1920). This
is on the ground that the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy
by raising the defense in the second action. However, in this
case, since the second action by the SEC which the plaintiff
seeks to enjoin is an administrative proceeding rather than a
law action, there may be some question regarding the adequacy
of his remedy so as to preclude operation of the rule of Plews
v. Burrage, supra.
In the instant case the Circuit Court granted the injunction.
Facing the issue squarely the Court said, at page 37, "The appli-
cability of the doctrine of res judicata is therefore the deter-
mining factor in the case." Otis & Co. v. SEC, 176 F. 2d 34
(D.C. Cir. 1949). The SEC contended that res judicata did not
apply as the rule governing the relation of courts and adminis-
trative agencies is different from the traditional rule that gov-
erns the relation of courts to each other. Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Co., 303 U. S. 41 (1937). The Court distinguished
the Myers case, supra, contending that while it stood for the
principle that the administrative process must be complete be-
fore there is recourse to a reviewing court, the case did not hold
that a "court cannot protect its decrees by enjoining the reliti-
gation of the same issues between the same parties before an
administrative agency." Otis & Co. v. SEC, supra, at 39.
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In reversing, the Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of
res judicata. However, they cited as authority for their decision,
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., supra; Macauley v. Water-
mn Steamship Corp., 327 U. S. 540 (1945); Federal Power
Commission v. Arkansas Light and Power Co., 330 U. S. 802
(1946). As these cases stand for the principle that the admin-
istrative remedy must be exhausted before one is entitled to
review by the courts, it would appear that the doctrine of res
judicata will not operate to alter that principle.
Elinor Porter
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